City University of New York (CUNY)

CUNY Academic Works
Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects

CUNY Graduate Center

2001

The Influence of Family and Community Ties on the Demand for
Home Equity Conversion Mortgages
Kenneth Allen Knapp
The Graduate Center, City University of New York

How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/2217
Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu
This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY).
Contact: AcademicWorks@cuny.edu

INFORMATION TO USERS
This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films
the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, som e thesis and
dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of
com puter printer.
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the
cop y submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations
and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper
alignment can adversely affect reproduction.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript
and there are missing pages, th ese will be noted.

Also, if unauthorized

copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.
Oversize materials (e.g., m aps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by
sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and continuing
from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps.
Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced
xerographically in this copy.

Higher quality 6” x 9” black and white

photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing
in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order.

ProQuest Information and Learning
300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 USA
800-521-0600

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

R e p ro d u c e d with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The Influence of Family and Community Ties
on the Demand for Home Equity Conversion Mortgages

Kenneth Allen Knapp

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Economics
in partial fulfillment o f the requirements for the degree o f Doctor of Philosophy,
the City University o f New York

2001

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

UMI Number. 3008842

Copyright 2001 by
Knapp, Kenneth Allen
All rights reserved.

___

®

UMI

UMI Microform 3008842
Copyright 2001 by Bell & Howell Information and Learning Company.
All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.

Bell & Howell Information and Learning Company
300 North Z eeb Road
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, Ml 4 8 106-1346

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

11

© 20 01

KENNETH ALLEN KNAPP
All Rights Reserved

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

This manuscript has been read and accepted by the Graduate Faculty in Economics in
satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.
[signature]

Date

Chair of Examining Committee
[signature]

Date

Executive Officer

Supervisory Committee:
Michael Grossman
Benjamin Klebaner
Charlotte Muller

THE C I T Y U N IV E R S IT Y OF NEW YORK

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

IV

ABSTRACT
The Influence o f Family and Community Ties
on the Demand for Home Equity Conversion Mortgages
by
Kenneth Allen Knapp
Adviser: Professor Michael Grossman

Reverse mortgages are loans against home equity that do not have to be repaid
until the borrower moves, sells the home, or dies. The loans generally are available only
to older homeowners, usually aged 62 or over. This paper explores whether demand for
reverse mortgages is influenced by the strength o f area’s family and community ties.
One type o f reverse mortgage is analyzed: the FHA-insured Home Equity Conversion
Mortgage (HECM). Several researchers have estimated the potential demand for reverse
mortgages.

To my knowledge, this is the first study of how actual demand may be

determined, and o f how it may be related to potential demand.
The unit o f analysis is a county in one o f 26 selected metropolitan areas in the
United States. The primary measures o f the strength o f a county’s family and community
ties are those relating to the out-migration o f young and old residents. Other variables
used to measure family ties include the degree o f religious adherence in the county and
the percent o f its residents that were bom in that state. Race and educational achievement
are also used in the analysis. Differences in the market development o f HECMs across
counties are accounted for by including measures o f HECM counselors and lenders that
are active in each area. Data from a variety o f sources are used. The data are analyzed
by method o f ordinary least squares and two-stage least squares regressions.
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Fairly strong evidence that family and community ties do influence demand for
HECMs is found. A higher incidence o f young out-migration, reflecting weak family and
community ties o f the young, tends to increase demand for reverse mortgages.

The

opposite is found for old out-migration, which implies that when the old are not attached
to their communities, they will be less interested in reverse mortgages. The percent of
persons bom in the same state as their current residence is found to negatively influence
demand.
Racial composition, educational achievement, and the extent o f market
development in an area also are found to influence demand for reverse mortgages.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Reverse mortgages are loans against honue equity that do not have to be repaid
until the borrower moves, sells the home, or di es. The loans generally are available
only to older homeowners, usually aged 62 orr over. This paper explores whether
demand for reverse mortgages is influenced boy the strength of area’s family and
community ties. Several previous studies obtained estimates o f the potential demand
for reverse mortgages. To my knowledge, this i s the first study of how actual demand
may be determined, and o f how it may be related! to potential demand.
The life-cycle model o f consumption

theorizes that after a certain age,

households begin to draw down wealth—including home equity—in order to smooth
consumption over time. Homeowners with a beq u est motive, however, may be less
inclined to do this because they would like to leav e an inheritance. In areas o f weak
family ties, the bequest motive should be relatively weak.

Homeowners in these

areas will be less concerned about preserving w ealth for future generations, and more
likely to draw down wealth in line with the life-cycle hypothesis—unless, that is, the
homeowners do not want to stay in the commurMity. In areas where their ties to the
community are relatively weak, older hom eowners will be less likely to exhibit
interest in reverse mortgages. Thus, both the strength o f an area’s family ties and the
degree to which its older residents are attached to the community are analyzed for
their effect on demand for reverse mortgages.
Reverse mortgages are one way for hom eow ners in the United States to draw
down home equity.

In contrast to a conventtional forward mortgage, monthly

repayments are not required on a reverse nnortgage.

Interest on the cash
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disbursements1 to the borrower continues to accrue over the life o f the loan and to be
added to the outstanding debt.2 The loan becomes due and payable (in full) only
when the borrower ceases to use the home as the primary residence, sells it, or dies.3
The home equity and not the creditworthiness o f the borrower secures a
reverse mortgage; therefore, the borrower’s ability to repay the debt is not an issue.
Nearly all reverse mortgages are restricted to older borrowers, usually aged 62 and
over.
The vast majority o f older persons would like to remain in their current homes
for as long as possible. The AARP found that 92 percent o f persons aged 65-74, and
95 percent o f those 75 and over, express a desire to age in place.4 With a reverse
mortgage, house-rich, income-poor older homeowners can realize their wish.

1.1. F a m il y t ie s ,

th e b e q u e s t m o t iv e , a n d t h e d e m a n d f o r r e v e r se m o r t g a g e s

The perspective o f this paper is that both the life-cycle and the bequest motive
theories operate in differing degrees in every household: some homeowners reduce
home equity as they age, and others will leave their homes to heirs. In areas where

1 Usually, the borrower may select from several disbursement options: lump sum, line-of-credit, and
monthly payments for life or for a specified number o f years.
“ As noted by Scholen (1996), forward mortgages may be characterized as “falling debt, rising equity,”
whereas reverse mortgages may be characterized as the opposite, “rising debt, falling equity.”
3 The loan may also be terminated if the borrower fails to maintain minimum property standards or to
pay property taxes and homeowner’s insurance.
AARP (2000a), p.24-25. The percents refer to those respondents who strongly or somewhat agreed
with the statement: “What I’d really like to do is stay in my current residence for as long as possible.”
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family ties are strong,5 evidence o f a bequest motive should be relatively prominent,
and demand for reverse mortgages should be relatively low.
The further a child lives from a parent, the weaker may be the
intergenerational family ties and any bequest motive on the part o f the parent. In the
aggregate, parents with children living afar are probably less likely than those with
children nearby to be concerned about leaving their homes as a bequest to their
children.

Data on the geographic proximity o f children to their parents would

improve any study o f the relationship between a bequest motive and the consumption
o f housing by older individuals. Unfortunately, such data are not available.
O f course, a child need not live near a parent to inherit the parent’s wealth,
including housing wealth. Nevertheless, parents who own homes may be interested
not in transferring wealth per se, but in transferring the physical property. This desire
would be stronger among parents with children living in the same vicinity than
among those with children living further away. Parents who feel relatively certain
that their children would actually live in the homes they bequeath to them have a
motive to bequeath their homes that other parents do not. Both types o f parents—
those who think that their children would inhabit the inherited home and those who
do not— may or may not possess a bequest motive insofar as financial wealth is
concerned. The parent with a child nearby, though, is more likely to bequeath the
home because there is a greater chance that the child would inhabit the home.

5 As discussed in Chapter 1.2, this study also analyzes community ties. The family and community ties
o f the old and young may influence demand for reverse mortgages differently, and so their separate
influences must be evaluated.
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Parents derive utility from bequeathing their homes to their children. The
probability that a parent will bequeath the home increases with the utility a child
receives from the bequest. The child’s utility depends positively not just on the dollar
value of the home, which can be sold and converted to financial wealth, but also on
the value he or she attributes to living in the inherited home (“consuming” the home).
Both the child living near and the one living afar derive utility from inheriting
the financial wealth represented by the home, but the former derives more o f this
“wealth utility” because disposing o f the house would involve greater time and
money costs for the child living afar. The child who lives near also derives more
utility from consuming the home because he or she is likelier than the child afar to
dwell in it.6 The more distant the child, the larger the disruption caused by the
relocation— the sacrifice o f proximity to a job, o f a preferred community
environment, etc.—and this lowers the utility derived from moving into the parent’s
home. Thus, total utility is expected to be higher for the child living near the parent.
On average, then, parents with children living nearby are likelier than other parents to
bequeath their homes, and hence less likely to be interested in reverse mortgages.
Rasmussen, Megbolugbe, and Morgan (1995) point out that reverse mortgages
may be ideal instruments for accommodating inter vivos wealth transfers. That is, the
transfer o f wealth from older homeowners to their children or grandchildren need not
occur only after the homeowner’s death. Thus, the authors claim, the desire to leave a

6 Even if the child does not intend to live in the parent’s house, the option to do so would exist. The
value o f this option is greater for the nearby child than for the one living afar.
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bequest probably will not decrease—and m ay even increase— demand for reverse
mortgages.
HUD does not systematically collect data on the uses o f HECM proceeds,7 so
it is not known how many of the loans are used for inter vivos transfers. Anecdotal
evidence suggests that the number o f HECMs taken out for this purpose is very
small.8 To the extent that HECMs are used to transfer wealth during the lifetimes o f
borrowers, the hypothesis that the existence o f a bequest motive will decrease the
demand for HECMs is weakened. However, the argument made above regarding the
desire o f older homeowners to transfer physical property continues to be relevant:
however much reverse mortgages may be used to accomplish inter vivos transfers o f
financial wealth, they cannot be used to transfer physical property—that is, the home
itself. In an area where family ties are strong, the desire to transfer the physical home
is relatively strong, and so demand for reverse mortgages— for whatever purpose— is
relatively low.
Since many borrowers apparently first leam about HECMs through their
children or other family members, it might be argued that older homeowners with

7 Ken Scholen, founder o f the National Center for Home Equity Conversion (NCHEC), and perhaps
the most widely respected authority on reverse mortgages in the U.S., calls the lack of data on the uses
o f HECM proceeds “the single most disappointing thing about the program.” [Personal
communication.]
8 Ken Scholen o f NCHEC has encountered a few borrowers who have used reverse mortgages “to
make bequests while they’re still alive so they can enjoy the process.” [Personal communication.]
Scholen’s guess is that the majority o f HECMs are used to pay o ff existing mortgages (thereby
increasing monthly income), to make home repairs or improvements, or to prepare for unexpected
financial emergencies. Analyzing borrower feedback from participants in a focus group, HUD (2000,
p.83) finds that “the goal o f most participants [for taking out the HECM] was to remain independent
and to enjoy the same quality of life to which they had been accustomed.” (Only 34 borrowers
participated in the focus group, so this claim must be regarded as tentative.)
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children are more likely than those without them to take out a reverse mortgage.9 A
similar argument is that those with children may take out a reverse mortgage to avoid
being a burden on their children, another reason demand for reverse mortgages might
be positively related to whether or not an older homeowner has children.10 These
arguments are flawed.
Would the borrower with children really be more likely than the other
homeowner to take out a HECM?

In order to answer this question properly,

everything else about the two prospective borrowers must be held equal— age, home
equity, home value, need for additional monthly income, the strength o f their areas’
family ties, and so on. The only possible differences between the two would be that
the one with children: (1) has a bequest motive; (2) may be more likely to have heard
about HECMs because o f a wider informational network; (3) may not want to be a
burden to the children; and (4) may be able to rely on the children for financial and
other support. In order for one to conclude that the parent with children would indeed
be more likely than the other to take out a HECM, points (2) and (3) would have to
weigh more than points (1) and (4). There is no reason to expect that this would be
the case.

9 Venessa White, vice president o f BNY Mortgage Co., said in a personal communication that often,
“children are the ones who push for reverse mortgages.” HUD’s (2000) focus-group analysis finds that
while some children bring HECMs to their parent’s attention, others regret their parent’s decisions to
take out these loans.
10 As Rasmussen, Megbolugbe, and Morgan (1995) suggest

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

7

1.2. O u t -m ig r a t io n m a t r ix

Data on individual households showing the proximity o f the householder’s
children, strength o f intergenerational ties o f the household, and whether or not the
householder has taken out a HECM are not available.

Instead, I analyze data on

family and community ties and HECM activity o f different counties in the U.S., each
o f which is a component o f one o f 26 selected metropolitan areas.

The primary

measures o f these ties relate to the out-migration o f old and young residents. Out
migration is defined as a move from the county to a location beyond the metropolitan
area.11
Taken together, a high (low) incidence o f out-migration o f the young and the
old indicates a general weakness (strength) o f the area’s family and community ties.
Each category o f out-migration (old and young) must be analyzed separately, though,
because they influence demand for reverse mortgages in different ways.
High out-migration o f young persons means that their ties to the community
and to family members remaining there are weak. Relative to areas where young out
migration is low, high young out-migration is expected to increase demand for
reverse mortgages because old homeowners in the community will be less
constrained by a bequest motive. Low out-migration of the young has the opposite
effect on demand.
High old out-migration indicates that the ties of old persons to the community
and to family members there are weak; however, the effect upon demand for reverse
mortgages is different than in the case o f high young out-migration. As with the
11 The definition o f a metropolitan area as a cluster o f counties is discussed further in Chapter IV.
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young, weak family ties among the old are expected to increase demand. In contrast
to the young, though, the effect of the weakness o f the old’s community ties is to
decrease demand. The reason is simple: old residents who plan to move will not be
interested in reverse mortgages, which are acquired only by persons who want to
remain in their homes. This would be true even if the old’s family ties were weak.
Regarding the demand for reverse mortgages, the weakness o f the old’s community
ties, as reflected in a high incidence of out-migration, dominates the weakness of their
family ties.
The interpretation o f a low incidence o f old out-migration is somewhat more
problematic.

On the one hand, low old out-migration suggests that the old are

strongly attached to their community; thus, demand for reverse mortgages might be
relatively high. On the other hand, low out-migration implies that the old’s ties to
family members in the area are strong, which would increase the power o f a bequest
motive for holding home equity, and therefore would decrease demand for reverse
mortgages.

By simultaneously accounting for the degree o f young out-migration,

these conflicting implications o f how a low incidence o f old out-migration might
influence demand are resolved, as the following discussion shows.
Figure 1 is a matrix identifying four counties: A, B, C and D. Consistent with
the definition o f out-migration used in this study, the matrix refers to movers from a
given county to a location beyond that county’s metropolitan area. A boldfaced, all
capitals “YOUNG” means that out-migration o f young persons is low, and a
lowercase “young” means that young out-migration is high. Similar meanings apply
to “OLD” and “old.”
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County A (OLD, YOUNG) is characterized by low out-migration o f both
young and old. The low young out-migration has a negative influence on demand for
reverse mortgages. The effect o f the low old out-migration, though, is ambiguous.
Demand for reverse mortgages in County A, however, is clearly lower than in
County B (O LD , young). There is low old out-migration in County B, just as in
County A. In County B, however, there is high out-migration o f the young. As a
result, the bequest motive is less prevalent in County B than in County A. Even
though the old in Counties A and B are equally attached to their communities (and to
family members still there), those in County A are more constrained by a bequest
motive, and therefore less likely to be interested in reverse mortgages. Thus, demand
for reverse mortgages is higher in County B than in County A.
Demand is also higher in County B than in County C, which is most easily
seen by observing that demand in County A is higher than in County C.

Both

counties (A and C) have low young out-migration, but County C (old, YOUNG) has
a high incidence o f old out-migration. The old homeowners in County C, then, are
less likely than those in County A to desire reverse mortgages because they are more
likely to want to move. Since, as already shown, demand is higher in County B than
in County A, the fact that demand is higher in A than in C implies that it is higher in
B than in C.
Demand is also higher in County B than in D (old, young). Both counties
exhibit a high degree o f young out-migration. The difference is that in County D,
there is also a high incidence o f old out-migration. Relative to D, old homeowners in
B want to remain in their communities, despite the fact that young out-migration is
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high. As a result, homeowners in B w ill be more interested in reverse mortgages than
those in D.
The goal of this study is to test whether or not it is true that demand for
reverse mortgages is higher in counties similar to B than in other counties. This
requires that the incidence o f old and young out-migration both be included in the
analysis.
Two other indicators o f the strength o f a county’s family ties are included in
this study: the percent o f residents who belong to a religious denomination, and the
percent who were bom in the county’s state. These are discussed in more detail in
Chapter IV, as are other variables not relating specifically to family or community
ties, but which may influence demand for reverse mortgages. These include race,
education, and the degree to which the reverse mortgage market is developed in the
county—as suggested by the per capita12 number o f active reverse mortgage lenders
and counselors.13
Before discussing these data and the method o f analysis, a brief description o f
the main types o f reverse mortgages available in the United States is given, followed
by a closer look at the one analyzed in this study—the Department o f Housing and
Urban Development’s (HUD’s) Home Equity Conversion Mortgage (HECM).

12 As discussed in Chapter IV, these measures are adjusted for the number o f homeowners that are
potential buyers o f reverse mortgages in an area (referred to as “potential demand”). The term “per
capita” here refers to these adjustments.
13 As explained below, borrowers o f the type o f reverse mortgage analyzed here are required to obtain
third-party (non-lender) counseling.
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n. TYPES OF REVERSE MORTGAGES
There are three major types o f private reverse mortgages [Table 1]: (1) the
HECM, initiated in 1989 by HUD and insured by the Federal Housing Administration
(FHA); (2) the Home Keeper reverse mortgage, designed and backed by the Federal
National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), initiated in 1995; and (3) Financial
Freedom Senior Funding Corporation’s (FFSFC’s) Cash Account Plan, a proprietary,
non-federally insured loan available in a limited number o f states. The presently
limited geographic availability makes it unsuitable for the purposes o f this study
The HECM’s share o f the private reverse mortgage market— 80 to 90
percent— far exceeds that o f the other tw o.14 As with the Home Keeper and FFSFC’s
Cash Account, the minimum eligible age for a HECM borrower is 62. HUD data on
the number o f HECMs sold by county, lender, and year are analyzed in this study.15
The borrower may use the proceeds o f a private reverse mortgage for any
purpose.

Public sector reverse mortgages, in contrast, are single-purpose loans.

There are two types o f public sector loans [Table 1]: deferred payment loans (DPLs)
and property tax deferrals (PTDs). Both are restricted to low- or moderate-income
households. DPLs are available from local government agencies and may only be
used to pay for home repair or improvements.

State- and local-govemment-

sponsored PTDs must be used to offset property taxes.

Public sector reverse

14 According to Roger Reynolds [personal communication], vice chairman o f Wells Fargo Home
Mortgage, Inc. and member of the National Reverse Mortgage Lenders Association’s board of
directors, HECMs represent about 90 percent o f all reverse mortgages originated by private lenders in
the United States. Tom Scabareti [personal communication], vice president o f marketing at FFSFC,
estimates the HECM’s market share at 80 to 85 percent, Home Keeper’s share at five percent, and
FFSFC’s Cash Account Plan at 10 to 15 percent.
15 Fannie Mae does not make data on its Home Keeper available to the public. [Quercia (1997), p.202,
fii.2.]
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mortgages are more numerous than private reverse mortgages, but their dollar
amounts are almost always much lower.16
Reverse mortgages have several factors in common.

The loan is due and

payable in full only when the borrower moves, sells the home, or dies.17 Compound
interest accrues on the outstanding balance. The maximum loan for which a borrower
is eligible depends on the value o f the home, the interest rate charged on the loan, and
the expected term o f the loan, which is based on the borrower’s life expectancy.18

16Scholen (1996), Ch. 18.
17 At one time, at least one proprietary lender offered a type of reverse mortgage that did not have to
be repaid if the borrower moved—this was Household Senior Services’ “Household Plan.” Some
reverse mortgages are fixed-term loans, which became due and payable after a specified number of
years.
18 The calculation o f the maximum loan amount is based on the borrower’s age-based life expectancy
(the expected term). The longer the life expectancy, the lower the loan amount. Depending on how
long the borrower actually lives and remains in the home, the actual term o f the loan will be different
from the expected term. Only the age o f the borrower is used to determine the expected remaining
years of life. Other factors such as health status, race, and sex are not considered.
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in . THE HOME EQUITY CONVERSION MORTGAGE19
The first HECM was closed in October 1989,20 two years after Congress
mandated that the HECM Insurance Demonstration be initiated. Many federal and
quasi-federal agencies, advocacy groups, financial institutions, and other interested
parties were involved in the design o f the HECM program. Besides an interoffice
working group created by HUD, these included Fannie Mae, the Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation, the AARP, the National Center for Home Equity Conversion
(NCHEC), the American Bar Association’s Commission on Legal Problems o f the
Elderly, state housing finance agencies, the U.S. Department o f Health and Human
Service’s Administration on Aging, lenders, private mortgage insurers, housing
counselors, area agencies on aging, and other public interest groups.21
Consumer advocacy groups— especially the NCHEC and AARP— were the
driving forces behind the initiation o f the HECM program. Industry representatives,
HUD, and other federal agencies “had to be dragged, kicking and screaming” into

!9This chapter has relied on several sources. HUD (1990), (1992), (1995), (2000); Scholen (1998);
and AARP (2000b) all provide fairly detailed, sometimes overlapping information on the general
features o f the HECM program including borrower eligibility, mandatory counseling, eligible
properties, and the calculation o f payments to borrowers. Since federal and state laws and HUD
regulations relating to HECMs are ever changing, the older publications are in some ways obsolete,
although they sometimes contain details that the others do not.
A wealth o f information on HECMs and other types o f reverse mortgages is also available
from several websites, including those maintained by AARP (Tittp://www.aara.org/revmort/). the
National Center for Home Equity Conversion ('http://reverse.org/'). and the National Reverse Mortgage
Lender’s Association ('http://www.reversemortgage.org/links.htm).
20HUD (1992), p.1-7.
21 HUD (1990).
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accepting the idea o f a federal reverse mortgage program, and the advocacy groups
did the dragging.22
For years leading up to Congressional inquiries into a federally supported
program, “massive efforts” by consumer advocates and others to generate interest
among private insurers failed.23

Insurers o f reverse mortgages are exposed to a

variety o f risks. From a lender’s perspective, there is tenure risk (the uncertain length
o f residency by the borrower), appreciation risk (the uncertain property appreciation
rates), and loan balance risk (the uncertainty o f the future amount o f the loan
balance).24 The borrower faces the risk that the lender will not make promised loan
disbursements (default risk)25 Evaluating the combination o f these risks and deriving
appropriate pricing mechanisms proved too large an obstacle to private insurers.26
Without a federally supported reverse mortgage insurance program, it is unlikely that
the market would have developed very extensively.
The FHA-insured HECM program was created partly as a “laboratory” in
which the special risks associated with reverse mortgages could be evaluated.27

22 Ken Scholen [personal communication]. That consumer advocacy groups were strongly in favor o f
establishing some type o f federal reverse mortgage program is evident from their testimonies before
Congress [for example, U.S. Congress, House, (1984) and U.S. Congress, Joint Briefing (1985)].
23 Ken Scholen [personal communication].
24 Loan balance risk stems both from uncertain future interest rates and uncertain cash disbursements to
the borrower (for example, it is not known when a borrower o f a line-of-credit HECM will withdraw
fimds, or how much the withdrawals will be).
25 U.S. Congress, Joint Briefing (1985), testimony by Maurice D. Weinrobe, Department of
Economics, Clark University.
26 Ken Scholen [personal communication]. According to Scholen, who was heavily involved in
discussions with private insurers, the insurers were uncomfortable with the “radical” nature o f reverse
mortgages. “Property [insurers] knew about appreciation risk, but not about mortality risk [the
uncertainty associated with the borrower’s life expectancy],” he said, “and [insurers who knew about]
mortality weren’t sure about tenure or property risk.”
27 Ken Scholen [personal communication].
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Besides attracting private insurers, it was hoped also that the federal program would
increase the involvement o f private originators, servicers, and investors.”28
Fifty FHA-approved lenders, each permitted to sell 50 HECMs, were selected
by lottery at the initiation o f the program. Originally, HUD was authorized to insure
2,500 HECMs through September 1991. A 1990 change in the law expanded the
program: the number o f authorized HECMs was increased to 25,000 through 1995
and all FHA-approved lenders were allowed to participate.29 In 1998, the program
became permanent, and allowable outstanding loans were increased to 150,000.3° By
the end of year 2000, FHA had insured a total o f 44,418 HECMs.31
The HECM program is specifically intended:
to meet the special needs o f elderly homeowners by reducing
the effect o f the economic hardship caused by the increasing
costs o f meeting health, housing, and subsistence needs at a
time o f reduced income . . . ,32

To be eligible for a HECM, the prospective borrower must be age 62 or
over.33 HUD may, at its discretion, set a higher age.34 Had HUD prescribed a higher
age to account for the fact that HECMs should appeal most to older homeowners (as
discussed below), it is possible that lenders could have marketed the HECM more

28 HUD (2000), p.32.
29HUD (1992), p. 1-2.
30HUD (2000).
31 Based on data obtained from HUD.
32 U.S. Code, Title 12, §17I5z-20(a).
33 When a couple takes out a reverse mortgage, the youngest borrower must be age 62 or over. There
are no restrictions on the number o f signatories with a HECM: “Three sisters or four friends would be
as eligible as a single individual or a couple, assuming that they are all 62 year[s] o f age or older and
are all owners o f the residence . . . but, in each case, [the amount o f the loan] would be based on the
age of the youngest borrower.” [HUD (1990), p.4-3],
34 U.S. Code, Tide 12, §1715z-20(b).
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efficiently.35 By selecting age 62, however, more prospective borrowers leam about
HECMs. Even i f the younger homeowners leam that the proceeds they can get from
a HECM are currently too low to be worthwhile, they m ay decide, based on the
information they gathered during their initial inquiries, that the loan might be useful
later, or that it might benefit someone else they know.36
Eligible

properties

include

owner-occupied

1-

to

4-family

homes,

manufactured homes built after June 1976, condominiums, and dwellings that are part
o f Planned Unit Developments. The law was amended in December 2000 to extend
eligibility to cooperative housing units.37
Among the costs bom e by the HECM borrower [Table 2] is mortgage
insurance, the premiums o f w hich are collected by the FHA. The insurance not only
protects the borrower from the risk o f lender default, but also protects the lender from
the “crossover” risk that the loan balance will exceed the value o f the home when the
loan becomes due and payable.

■ jo

All types o f reverse mortgages provide that the

amount owed cannot exceed the value o f the home at the time the loan becomes
payable. The value o f the hom e might be less than the loan balance if the borrower
lives in the home for longer than expected, if interest rates rise unexpectedly over the
life o f the loan, or if the home appreciates too slowly.39 Other costs that must be paid

35 Persons at younger ages often discover after visiting and spending time with lenders (and with
counselors) that the amount o f the loan for which they qualify is too low to warrant taking out a
HECM. [Ken Scholen (personal communication).] In such cases, the time spent by the lender
educating the prospective borrower goes unrewarded.
36 Ken Scholen [personal communication]. All the thoughts in this paragraph are his.
37 National Reverse Mortgage Lenders Association website http://reversemortgage.org (accessed
February 20, 2001).
38Discussions of crossover risk and its relationship to insurance risk and borrower payments may be
found in Szymanoski (1990) and Chinloy and Megbolugbe (1994).
39 HUD (2000).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

17

by the borrower include origination fees, closing costs, servicing fees,40 and interest.
These costs may be paid for with the proceeds o f the loan— that is, the borrower is
not required to have the cash necessary to pay for these costs up front.
HUD requires that the interest rate charged on adjustable-rate HECMs must
be equal to the one-year, constant maturity Treasury security index plus a lender’s
margin.41

Currently, Fannie Mae is the secondary market buyer o f virtually all

HECMs.42 Fannie Mae determines the lender’s margin that must be applied to
HECMs that it will purchase;43 thus, all mortgagees charge the same interest on newly
originated HECMs.

Mortgagees could, if they wished, charge a higher lender’s

margin than that set by Fannie Mae, but then Fannie Mae would not invest in their
HECMs. Although, theoretically, mortgagees could charge a lower margin and still
sell their HECMs to Fannie Mae, this is very unlikely to occur in practice. The
profitability o f HECMs is already low—below that o f conventional forward
mortgages— and market activity is modest. Charging lower interest than the Fannie
Mae standard would almost certainly result in lower profits because it is unlikely that
loan volume would increase enough— if it increased at all— to offset the reduced
revenue generated by each HECM originated.44
To date, only a few small lenders— originating altogether a “trivial number of
loans”—have chosen to retain their HECM assets rather than sell them to Fannie
40 Servicing HECMs includes maintaining data on monthly loan activity, providing borrowers with
periodic loan statements, certifying occupancy and property maintenance, changing borrower payment
plans, accepting mortgage repayments, declaring the mortgage due and payable, and many other tasks.
[Fannie Mae (2000)].
41 HUD (1994).
42 HUD (2000), pp.50-51.
43 Fannie Mae (2000).
44 Venessa White, vice president of BNY Mortgage Co. [personal communication].
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Mae.45 (Whether the lender’s margins on their loans differ from those o f other
HECM originators is not known.) Capital constraints may reduce the willingness o f
lenders to hold HECMs or other types o f reverse mortgages in their portfolios 46
Unlike forward mortgages, where monthly cash inflows from the borrower begin
approximately one month after the debt is originated, cash inflows from reverse
mortgages— one-time, lump-sum repayments— usually occur only after several years.
In March 2001, the Fannie Mae lender’s margins were 1.20 percentage points
for monthly adjustable loans and 2.10 points for annually adjusted loans.47 Very few
fixed-rate HECMs, which are also permitted by HUD, have been originated because
Fannie Mae will not purchase them.
The borrower may elect to receive the HECM loan: as a single lump-sum, as a
line-of-credit (that grows over time), as a monthly cash advance for a fixed period
(“term” loan), as a monthly cash advance for as long as the borrower lives in the
home (“tenure” loan), or as any combination o f lump sum, credit line, or monthly
cash advance. The borrower has the right to change the method o f loan disbursement
at any time.
As with all reverse mortgages, the maximum loan allowable with a HECM
depends positively on the age o f the borrower and the value of the home, and
negatively on the interest rate applied to the loan.48 With the interest rate, home
value, and other factors—such as race, sex, and household income—given, the appeal

45 HUD (2000), p.50, fh.29.
46 Tom Atwell, senior business manager for senior products at the Single-Family Marketing division of
Fannie Mae [personal communication].
47 Adjustments are linked to changes in the one-year Treasury index.
48 For a detailed analysis o f how HECM payments are determined, see Szymanoski (1990).
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o f a reverse mortgage should increase with the age o f the homeowner, as older
borrowers will receive larger cash outlays.49 The age-based life expectancy of the
borrower is used to estimate the life o f the loan when it is originated. Cash outlays to
older borrowers are expected to be o f shorter duration, and so can be larger in dollar
amount to achieve any given loan balance.
Female general population mortality tables are used for all borrowers to
determine loan payments under the HECM program.50

Federal law prohibiting

discrimination against loan applicants on the basis o f sex means that gender-specific
mortality tables cannot be used to determine HECM payments.51 (The same law
covers discrimination by race).

In designing the HECM, HUD chose to use the

female mortality tables instead o f blended tables— which would have been allowable
under the law—partly because “a large majority o f borrowers [were] expected to be
female.”52
Given their lower age-based life expectancies [Table 3], males essentially get
a worse deal from HECMs than do females. For example, with a tenure loan, males
will receive the same payments as females, but for fewer years (on average). Insofar
as the HECM design should be more appealing to females than to males, HUD’s
expectation that a high percent o f borrowers would be females is at least partly selffulfilling. As Table 4 shows, females living alone represent a much higher percent of

49 HUD (Mar. 1995).
50 HUD (1990) With multiple signatories, payments are based on the age o f the youngest borrower.
51 U.S. Code, Title 15, §1691(a).
52 HUD (1990), p.5-2.
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HECM borrowers (56.3% in 1999) than they do o f all older homeowners (29.6% in
1997).53
As whites have higher life expectancies than blacks54 [Table 3], the HECM is
basically a better bargain for them. Thus, it might be expected that whites would
represent a higher percent o f HECM borrowers than they do o f all older homeowners,
and that the opposite would be true o f blacks. This was generally true earlier in the
HECM program [Table 4], but not later. Whites made up 92.7 percent o f HECM
borrowers in 1995 (compared to 87.2% o f all homeowners), but only 86.4 percent in
1999. Meanwhile, the percent of HECM borrowers who are black rose from 5.9 to
9.2 (7.8% o f all older homeowners are black).
It is possible that more effective marketing o f the HECM product to minorities
than to whites may explain the shift in racial composition.

Lenders receive an

implicit reward for marketing HECMs to minorities. Fannie Mae, which invests in
virtually all HECMs sold, must meet minimum income-based and geographically
targeted housing goals when purchasing mortgages.

One o f the geographically

targeted goals relates to “properties located in census tracts within metropolitan areas
where . . . minorities comprise 30 percent or more o f the residents and the median
income o f families does not exceed 120 percent o f the area median income.”55
HECMs that are sold to borrowers in such areas may be easier to re-sell to Fannie
Mae—if not now, when market activity is fairly low and when the ability to re-sell is
53 In Table 4, the figures on all homeowners are for 1997 (except for income (1995)), whereas the
figures for HECM borrowers are for 1995 and 1999. Using the 1997 figures instead o f the 1995 and
1999 figures for all homeowners [available in U.S. Census Bureau (1997) and (2001)] facilitates the
comparison to HECM borrowers without affecting the conclusions reached in the text.
54 The data refer to non-Hispanic white and black persons. Hispanics may be o f any race.
55 HUD (1996), p.23.
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not a real concern, then perhaps when market activity expands. Lenders subject to
Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) requirements may also target minorities, since
HECMs qualify for CRA credit.56
Besides race and ethnicity, Table 4 compares other characteristics o f HECM
borrowers to all other older homeowners. As expected, the average HECM borrower
tends to be older than the average o f all older homeowners. (The gap is wider than
suggested in Table 4, since the total group o f older homeowners is aged 65 and over,
compared to 62 and over for the HECM group.).
Table 4 also shows that the median income o f HECM borrowers is below that
o f other older homeowners; however, HUD (2000) warns that the data underlying this
figure are not reliable.57 It is possible that lower income homeowners are in greater
need o f converting their home equity into cash in order to meet daily living expenses,
medical bills, etc.
HUD (Mar. 1995) reported that HECM borrowers had an average o f 0.59
children, but the data underlying this statistic were later determined to be unreliable.58
It is reasonable to assume that the average number o f children among HECM
borrowers is lower than the average among non-borrower since older homeowners
with children are likelier than those without to avoid reverse mortgages (because o f a
higher bequest motive).59

56 HUD (Mar. 1995), p.3-5.
57 A later tabulation o f the data revealed many cases where values were zero or missing.
58 As with the income data, a later analysis revealed a high percent o f missing or zero values. The zero
values for number o f children could indicate either that the value is indeed zero or that the respondent
did not supply the information.
59 In other words, HECM borrowers are likelier to have no children, which lowers the average number.
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The median appraised property value tends to be greater among HECM
borrowers ($107,000 for all loans closed 1989-1999) than among all older
homeowners ($87,000 in 1997).60 The percent o f HECMs taken out by residents of
central cities (41.3%) is much higher than the percent o f all older homeowners that
live there (24.1%). In contrast, the percent o f HECM borrowers who reside in non
metropolitan areas (11.8%) is lower than the corresponding percent o f all older
homeowners (18.7%).61

60 HUD (2000).
61 HUD (2000).
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IV. DATA AND METHOD OF ANALYSIS
IV. 1. M e t h o d

o f a n a l y s is

The method o f ordinary least squares (OLS) is used test whethier the strength
of an area’s family ties influences the demand for HECMs. To address the possible
endogeneity o f one o f the regressors (LENDERS), a two-stage least squares (TSLS)
regression is also performed.
The unit o f analysis is a county in one o f 26 selected m etropolitan areas in the
United States (Table 5). Counties are included within a metropolitan ar-ea by the U.S.
Office o f Management and Budget (OMB) when there are strong social and economic
linkages between the counties and a populous core area.62 This stu d y follows the
1990 metropolitan area definitions.
Appendix A describes o f all the variables and their expected sigzns. Summary
statistics o f the variables are provided in Table 6.63

IV. 2. D e p e n d e n t v a r ia b l e
The dependent variable, HECM9000, is the number o f FH A-endorsed HECMs
purchased over a ten-year period (1990-2000) by borrowers residing un the county,

62The OMB analyzes the level o f commuting to jobs between a county and a central c ity to determine
whether to include that county in a metropolitan area. Counties are convenient bui3ding blocks of
metropolitan areas both because county boundaries do not change and because o f thee prevalence of
countywide data. [McDonald, 1997, pp.4-5. See U.S. Census Bureau (1998), App»endix II, for a
detailed discussion o f the OMB standards.]
63 Data sources are listed just prior to the list o f references at the end o f the paper.
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divided by potential demand for reverse mortgages in the county, times 1,000.64 In
other words, HECM9000 is the number o f HECMs purchased per 1,000 units o f
potential demand over a ten-year period.

IV. 3. P o t e n t ia l

d e m a n d f o r r e v e r se m o r t g a g e s

Several studies conducted in the past decade attempted to estimate the
potential demand for reverse mortgages. To my knowledge, this study is the first to
attempt to explain actual demand for reverse mortgages, and to relate actual demand
to potential demand.
Researchers have estimated the number (or proportion) o f households with
characteristics they considered representative o f potential interest in reverse
mortgages. In general, potentially interested homeowners are those that are very old,
have high housing equity, and receive low incomes.

The underlying idea is that

households that can increase their cash flows substantially through a reverse
mortgage will have relatively high interest in these loans.
Varying estimates have been derived based on different assumptions about
which income level, housing valuation, and age o f householder should be used to
indicate potential demand. Merrill, Finkel, and Kutty (1994) use the 1989 American
Housing Survey to estimate a “lower bound” o f potential demand in the U.S. equal to

64 According to both Ken Scholen o f the NCHEC and Venessa White o f BNY Mortgage Co., all but a
trivial number of lenders charged the same interest rates on HECMs throughout this period. Earlier in
the HECM program, when a few investors besides Fannie Mae were active in the secondary market for
HECMs, some lenders— very few o f them—may have sold HECMs at interest rates different from
those required by Fannie Mae. For the past several years, Fannie Mae has been the only active
investor in HECMs. Thus, there is no need to correct for interest rate differences across lenders when
analyzing demand.
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800,000 households. This was the number o f householders in 1989 aged 70 and over
who had lived in their homes for more than 10 years, with annual income o f 530,000
or less, and with home equity between 5100,000 and 5200,000.65
Defining potential demand as equal to the number o f homeowners aged 62
and over who could increase their monthly income by 20% or more with a reverse
mortgage, M ayer and Simons (1994) estimate potential demand at six million
households (1990). The authors’ estimates are based on an analysis o f the Census
Bureau’s 1990 Survey o f Income and Program Participation.
Kutty (1998) uses data from the 1991 American Housing Survey, and finds
that 621,000 homeowners aged 65 and over could have been raised above the poverty
level in 1991 i f they would have obtained a reverse mortgage. This represented 29
percent o f all poor householders aged 65 and over in that year.
Rasmussen, Megbolugbe, and Morgan (1995) use the U.S. Census Public Use
Microdata Sample (5%) to derive an estimate o f 6.7 million homeowners aged 70 and
over with 530,000 or more in home equity (in 1989). These homeowners compose
what the authors call the “primary market” for reverse mortgages.

The authors’

estimates suggest that an additional 4.4 million homeowners aged 62-69 would have
entered the primary market group by 1998, bringing total potential demand in the
United States to 11 million.
In addition to estimating potential demand for the entire U.S., Rasmussen,
Megbolugbe, and Morgan (1995) also estimate potential demand for selected

65 Householders with equity above 5200,000 were excluded because the authors thought they “are
more likely to have other assets and may not want a reverse mortgage.” [op. cit., pp.279-280].
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metropolitan areas. A weighted average o f their metropolitan area estimates was used
to derive this study’s county-level figures. The weights are based on the percent o f a
metropolitan area’s homeowners aged 75 and over that reside in each county (1990
data).66
Rasmussen, Megbolugbe, and Morgan argue that reverse mortgages should be
viewed as tools not only for smoothing consumption over time, as predicted by the
Iife-cycle hypothesis, but also as “asset management tools.” In their view, the ability
to alter the composition o f wealth— from illiquid to liquid assets— is an attractive
feature o f reverse mortgages for prospective borrowers at all income levels. Hence,
»

unlike other researchers, they do not consider income in their estimate o f potential
demand. Restricting an estimation o f potential demand to homeowners whose loan
proceeds would represent a “large” percent of their monthly incomes entails making
an arbitrary choice o f what loan-to-income figure to use as a threshold.

This

restriction ignores the asset-management feature o f reverse mortgages.
Insofar as it is calculated without being truncated at some arbitrary income
threshold, Rasmussen, Megbolugbe, and Morgan’s estimate represents an upper
bound of potential demand for reverse mortgages. In my study, estimation o f actual
demand is adjusted for this upper-bound measure o f potential demand.67

66 Data on homeowners aged 70 and over were not available, so those aged 75 and over were used. To
the extent that the distribution across metropolitan areas is different for homeowners aged 75 and over
than it is for those aged 70 and over, the weights are flawed. My analysis o f 1,850 counties, including
the 129 observations in this study, reveals that it is unlikely that the distributions are different
systematically. Two sums were calculated using 1990 Census population data: one o f persons aged
70-74 across the 1,850 counties, and one o f those aged 75-79. The percents o f these totals represented
by each county were then determined. The correlation between the two percents is 0.998.
6 As mentioned, analysis in this paper is at the county level, and Rasmussen, Megbolugbe, and
Morgan’s estimates for selected metropolitan are used to derive potential demand for each county.
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IV. 4. I n d e p e n d e n t v a r ia b l e s i n O LS
As discussed in Chapter I, the principal measures o f the strength o f a county’s
family and community ties that are used in this study are two relating to out
migration—out-migration o f the young ( Y_OUT'), and out-migration o f the old
(OLDJDUT'). These variables refer to the percent o f residents o f a certain age that
moved from a county to a location beyond that county’s metropolitan area during the
1985-1990 period.
OLD OUT is the percent o f all residents aged 60-79 in 1985 who outmigrated by 1990.

In 1990, the beginning of the 1990-2000 period over which

HECM loan activity is analyzed in this study, this cohort would have been aged 6584. HUD (2000) reports that about three-fourths o f HECMs purchased through the
year 1999 were by persons in this age group. The midpoint o f this age group is
approximately equal to the m edian age o f all HECM borrowers (75).
The percent o f residents out-migrating in one period is probably serially
correlated with the percent in previous periods.

For example, if the 1985-1990

percent was high, then among the pool o f older homeowners living in the county in
1990, a high percent o f them probably plan to move.

(Out-migration data analyzed

here are from 1985-1990; data on HECM loan activity are from 1990-2000.) If they
plan to move, then they will not desire a HECM. Thus, the expected sign o f this
coefficient is negative.68

68 Chapter 1.2 provides a detailed discussion o f how OLD_OUT and YJDUT are expected to influence
demand.
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Y_OUT is the percent o f persons aged 25-39 in 1985 who moved out o f the
metropolitan area by 1990. Those younger than 25 were not selected in order to
avoid individuals o f primary college age, who may move temporarily to attend
college before returning home. The expected sign of Y_OUT is positive because a
high percent reflects weak family ties among the young and a weak attachment to the
community, reducing any bequest motive among the old homeowners in the area.
Other variables used to measure the strength o f a county’s family ties are
RELIGION and B O R N JN .
RELIGION is the percent o f residents who belong to a religious denomination.
By including this variable, the aphorism “The family that prays together, stays
together,” is taken seriously. When RELIGION is high, intergenerational bonds are
thought to be relatively strong. The expected sign o f RELIGION is negative.
BORN_IN is the percent o f the county’s population who were bom in the
same state as their current residence.

When B O R N J N is high-, this increases the

likelihood that multiple generations o f the same family live in the county.

As a

consequence, demand for reverse mortgages is expected to be relatively low.
B O R N J N is expected to be negative.
Two other independent variables are included in the regressions: WHITE and
ED. These variables do not relate specifically to family ties, but may influence
demand for HECMs for other reasons.
WHITE is the percent o f the population who are white.

As discussed in

Chapter m , whites have higher average life expectancies than do non-whites, so the
HECM is basically a better deal for them. As a result, it is possible that demand
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among whites will be greater than among non-whites, so the expected sign o f WHITE
is positive.
Whites as a group could have stronger or weaker family ties than non-whites.
I f family ties among whites are generally weaker, then WHITE would still be
expected to have a positive impact upon demand for HECMs.

However, if ties

among whites are stronger, then WHITE could be negative.
ED is the percent o f residents aged 25 and over who have graduated from
college. The expected sign o f ED is positive because it is assumed that persons with
higher educational status are more sophisticated (on average) when it comes to
financial investments, and better able to judge the costs and benefits o f financial
instruments, especially those as complex as reverse mortgages.69
It is well known that educational achievement and income are highly,
positively correlated.

(For the 129 counties in this study, the simple correlation

between ED and the counties’ median income (INCOME) equals 0.5909 (Table 7).)
Thus, in the regressions reported here, the coefficient on ED picks up some o f the
effect o f INCOME.

As discussed below, INCOME is used as an instrument for

LENDERS, which is possibly endogenous.
Previously, it was mentioned that the demand for HECMs possibly might be
negatively related to income. Theoretically, excluding INCOME from the regressions
may create biased estimators; however, an analysis o f regressions that were run with
and without INCOME reveals that neither the coefficients nor the statistical

69 When ED is high, the percent o f older persons (that is, those eligible for HECMs) that are highly
educated is assumed to be high also. A similar assumption is made regarding WHITE.
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significance of the remaining regressors are substantially altered.70 For this reason,
but especially because INCOME is considered a fairly good instrument for
LENDERS, the variable is excluded from the regressions (except as an instrument).
Two measures of the degree to which the HECM market is developed—
LENDERS and COUNSMSA— are included among the explanatory variables. These
variables are included to account for variation across observations in the availability
o f HECMs, the intensity with which they are marketed, and the ease with which
prospective borrowers may obtain correct information about them.
The first measure o f market development relates to HECM counseling. To
ensure that they “understand the full impact of tapping into home equity,”71
prospective borrowers are required by law to obtain counseling from a HUDapproved housing counseling agency before they can take out a HECM.

A party

other than the lender must provide the counseling. To prevent conflicts o f interest, it
is unlawful for counselors to charge a fee for referring a prospective borrower to a
lender.72
Advocates for the elderly, lenders, and others involved in developing the
HECM program generally agree that counseling is warranted both because o f “the
newness and complexity” o f the loans, and because of “[t]he vulnerability o f many

10 Nor is the overall explanatory power o f the regressions much affected by excluding INCOME. In
fact, the adjusted R-square tends to increase slightly without INCOME. In the regressions where
INCOME is included, it is not statistically significant.
71 HUD (Mar. 1995), p.4-1.
72 HUD (2000). Conflicts o f interest may exist nevertheless. A majority o f counseling agencies
interviewed by HUD reported that lenders refer all or most o f the prospective HECM borrowers that
walk through their doors. Some borrowers interviewed did not realize that they had even received
counseling, but had thought they were dealing with representatives o f the lender.
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elderly households.”73 Some prospective borrowers resent the mandatory counseling
as paternalistic.74 Others who had counseling and then decided to take out a HECM
complained later that “they were not aware o f the full costs o f [the] loans and would
not have chosen a HECM if they had been better informed o f other options.”75
Although these complaints suggest that the quality o f counseling is not always up to
par (as discussed below, this is well known), they also suggest that mandatory
counseling— when adequate—may not be a bad idea.
The counseling session is intended help the prospective borrower make an
informed decision about the suitability o f a HECM for his or her financial needs and
situation.

In the session, the counselor must discuss (a) the availability to the

homeowner o f other housing options (such as selling the home and moving into a
rented apartment),76 social services, and financial resources; (b) other reverse

73 HUD (1992), p.4-1.
74 HUD (1992).
75 HUD (2000), p.78. As discussed below, HECM counselors are required to discuss the financial
implications o f HECMs with the prospective borrower. Counselors and the prospective borrowers
both must sign a “Counselor Certificate” certifying that the financial implications and other specific
matters (reviewed below) were discussed in detail. Thus, prospective borrowers that are unhappy with
the quality o f the information provided by counselors have only themselves to blame if they chose to
sign the certificate nevertheless.
Federal Truth-in-Lending law requires that EECM lenders disclose to borrowers the Total
Annual Loan Cost (TALC) o f the loans. This is the annual rate that, when applied to the cash
advances received by the borrower, would generate the outstanding debt at a specified future date.
(The total debt includes not only the cash advances and accrued interest, but also origination fees,
closing costs, servicing fees, and insurance premiums [which all accrue interest] financed by the loan.)
The TALC is considered the best indicator o f a HECM’s cost, and allows borrowers to compare costs
across different types o f reverse mortgages. [Scholen (1996); HUD (2000), pp.92-94. TALC
requirements are discussed in detail on the NCHEC website, www.reverse.org/info.update.tila.html]
That some EECM borrowers complain about not understanding the “full costs” o f the loans is
not necessarily a reflection o f inadequate counseling, since it is the lender’s responsibility to disclose
the TALC. Since there are strict federal guidelines, it is highly unlikely that any lender would fail to
properly disclose TALC rates to borrowers.
6 HUD is vague about the type o f housing options that must be discussed with the prospective
borrower. According to ETCJD’s HECM handbook (for use by HUD personnel, counseling agencies,
and lenders), the counselor must discuss “[t]he options other than home equity conversion that are
available to the borrower, including other housing.. . options.” (HUD (1994), p. 2-3]
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mortgage programs (such as DPLs and PTDs); (c) the financial implications
associated with HECMs; and (d) the consequences o f HECMs on tax status,
eligibility for public benefits, and estate and heirs o f the homeowner.77 Whenever
feasible, face-to-face counseling must be provided. HUD regulations stipulate that
“ [t]elephone counseling should not even be mentioned as an alternative to the
homeowner unless the possibility o f face-to-face counseling has been completely
ruled out.”78
COUNSMSA is the number o f HUD-approved housing counselors who
offered HECM counseling79 in the county’s metropolitan area as o f March 2001, per
1,000 units o f potential demand in the metropolitan area.80

A high value for

COUNSMSA is interpreted as a relatively high degree o f market development.
This measure o f market development is imperfect. As mentioned in footnote
80, not all counties have HECM counselors, and the number o f metropolitan-wide
counselors is used to calculate COUNSMSA. This means that some homeowners in a
metropolitan area w ill five in the county where counselors are located, and others will
not. Those living in the same county as the counselors will likely have better access
to counseling services. Another shortcoming with COUNSMSA is that it does not
account for the quality o f the counseling provided, which can vary greatly from one

77 HUD (July 1995).
78 HUD (1994).
79 HECM counseling is one o f several types o f counseling that may be offered by HUD-approved
housing counseling agencies.
These include default/foreclosure counseling, rent delinquency
counseling, pre-purchase and pre-rental counseling [HUD (July 1995)].
80 Many o f the counties analyzed in this study have no HECM counselors. For this reason, the number
o f counselors across the metropolitan area is used.
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housing counseling agency to another.81 Lastly, the number o f agencies that are
approved by HUD to offer HECM counseling may overstate the number that actually
provide the service.82
The other measure o f HECM market development is LENDERS, the number
o f financial institutions that have sold (originated) one or more HECMs in a county
over a ten-year period (1990-2000), per 1,000 units o f potential demand. The period
1990-2000 captures all mortgagees that have sold HECMs since the inception o f the
program except for two sold in 1989.83
Any given financial institution can sell one or more HECMs in a county. In
six o f the 135 counties for which data were obtained, the value of LENDERS is zero;
by definition, HECM9000 must also be zero in these six cases. These six counties are
excluded from the regressions reported here, leaving 129 observations.
Individual financial institutions may vary greatly in marketing intensity,
managerial skill, and customer satisfaction. Moreover, LENDERS almost certainly
undercounts the number o f institutions that have actually entered the HECM market
in a county, as those that offer the HECM product but fail to sell any are

81 HUD (2000), and Ken Scholen [personal communication], who has trained many o f today’s HECM
counselors.
82 HUD (2000).
83 The HUD data used in this study to calculate LENDERS and HECM9000 show that two HECMs
were sold to residents of Bernalillo County, New Mexico in 1989, a county that is not among the
observations o f this study. However, it is well established that the first HECM was closed in 1989 by
the James B. Nutter Company to a resident o f Fairway, Kansas, which is in Johnson County, one o f the
counties included in the 129 observations o f this study [HUD (1990, p.1-4) and Scholen (1998,
p .l 15)]. The ErtJD data erroneously show zero HECMs sold in Johnson County in 1989. The one sold
in 1989 is almost certainly included in the 1990 data.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

34

unobservable in the data.84 As with COUNSMSA, LENDERS should be considered a
crude estimate of market development.

IV . 5 . POSSIBLE ENDOGENEITY OF LENDERS

Ceteris paribus, demand for HECMs will be higher in a county where many
financial institutions have entered the HECM market than in a county where few
have. Not only are prospective borrowers more likely to have heard about HECMs in
counties where the number o f active lenders is relatively high, but also the transaction
costs for obtaining a HECM are probably lower. Transaction costs would include
gathering information about how HECMs work, locating financial institutions that
offer them, visiting a lender, and comparison-shopping.85
Commercial banks, savings

and loans, credit unions,

and mortgage

companies 86 that choose to offer the HECM product are already in place, and simply
offering a new product to their customers. It is unlikely that lenders evaluated any of
the independent variables used here when determining whether or not to offer
HECMs in a county. In addition to wanting to tap into “the potentially large and
growing” HECM market arising from the impending retirement o f the baby boom
84 That is, financial institutions that offered the HECMs but failed to sell any do not appear in the data.
Only lenders that have sold at least one HECM from 1990 through 2000 are included in the data.
85 While interest rates on newly originated HECMs are equal across lenders, origination fees and
closing costs may vary (within limits set by HUD), at least theoretically. According to Venessa White
o f BNY Mortgage Co. [personal communication], providing customer service, rather than adjusting
origination fees and/or closing costs, is the main way that lenders compete for HECM customers.
Differences in origination fees and closing costs across lenders cannot be accounted for in the data. It
is assumed that, on average, residents across the counties studied are charged the same origination fees
and closing costs. Comparison-shopping would include not just comparing origination fees and
closing costs across different lenders, but in comparing customer service.
86 Seventy-five percent o f HECMs originated in 1999 were by mortgage companies. [HUD (2000)]
The percent sold by credit unions is very small— data obtained from HUD show that o f the 44,418
HECMs closed through the end o f 2000, only 28 were originated by credit unions.
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generation, one o f the m ain reasons lenders decide to offer HECMs is as a hedge
against demand fluctuations in the conventional forward mortgage market.87 For
example, if demand for forward mortgages falls because o f rising unemployment,
then HECM business may offset the consequent reduction in a lender’s revenue.
It is assumed that once a financial institution has decided to offer HECMs, its
supply o f HECMs is completely responsive to demand. That is, the institution will
sell as many HECMs as are demanded by borrowers. Given the very modest numbers
o f HECMs sold thus far in the U.S., it is extremely doubtful that lenders are
concerned with putting a cap on the number o f HECMs they will originate due to
investment portfolio considerations.

Indeed, some lenders are dropping out of the

HECM program because o f low activity.88
In other words, LENDERS is considered exogenous in the OLS regression.
However, to account for the possibility that it is endogenous, a TSLS regression is
also performed, with LENDERS as the instrumented variable.

IV. 6. Instruments in TSLS
In the TSLS regression, BANKS—the number o f commercial and savings
banks in the county (1995 data) per 1,000 units o f potential demand— is used as an
instrument for LENDERS*9 It is reasonable to suppose that LENDERS is more likely

87 HUD (2000), p.33.
88 In 1998 and 1999, for the first time since the initiation of the program, more financial institutions left
the HECM market than entered it. The decision to leave has been based mainly on a perceived lack o f
demand [HUD (2000)]. At least one lender was active in at least one year from 1990-2000 in every
county evaluated in the regressions o f this study.
89 The essence of the TSLS technique is that each potentially endogenous right-hand side variable (in
this case, only one—LENDERS) is replaced by a proxy that is assumed to be uncorrelated with the
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to be high when BANKS is high. The simple correlation between the two variables is
0.47 (Table 7).
Table 7 suggests that two other variables— INCOM E and MARRYKID— may
be good instruments for LENDERS (simple correlations with LENDERS o f 0.40 and
0.65, respectively). INCOME is the median income o f the county, and MARRYKID is
the percent o f all households composed o f married couples residing with their
children.
It is not unlikely that financial institutions evaluate income and household
composition when making marketing decisions.

High-income areas are likely to

generate greater business activity for financial institutions on both the liability side
(deposits) and asset side (loans) of their balance sheets, and so are attractive to these
institutions. Indeed, the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) was passed to ensure
that depository institutions were meeting the credit needs o f the low- and moderateincome households located in their communities.90 Such protections were not needed
for high-income households. INCOME is used as an instrument for LENDERS with
the assumption that financial institutions will be drawn to high-income areas.91
As mentioned above (footnote 86), mortgage companies have closed about
three out o f every four HECMs sold to date. Either commercial banks or savings and
loans have sold all but a trivial number o f the other 25% o f HECMs. The main

disturbance. The proxy is an estimate o f the original variable determined by regressing the original on
all exogenous variables, including the instruments. [Greene (1997), Ch. 16.]
90 U.S. Code, Title 12, §2901.
91 The CRA does not prevent a depository institution from choosing where to locate; rather, it requires
the institution to meet the credit needs o f the entire community (including low- and moderate-income
neighborhoods) in which they do locate.
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business o f savings and loans is making conventional home loans. Thus, the vast
majority o f HECM originators specialize in the residential mortgage market.
Areas where a high percent o f households are composed o f married couples
with children are probably attractive marketing areas for such financial institutions.
Demand in these areas for the non-reverse-mortgage products they sell—home
purchase loans, refinancing o f home loans, and home equity lines o f credit—may be
relatively high. For example, in 1999, nearly 30% o f all homeowners were in this
demographic group.92 For these reasons, MARRYKID is used as another instrument
for LENDERS. There are three instruments for LENDERS, then: BANKS, INCOME,
and MARRYKID.

92 U.S. Census Bureau (2001).
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V. FINDINGS

V I.A . OLS— LENDERS INCLUDED
Table 8 shows all o f the regression results: OLS with and without the possibly
endogenous variable LENDERS, and TSLS.

The OLS regression including

LENDERS is reported first, and then the consequences o f excluding the variable are
reviewed, followed by a discussion o f the TSLS findings.
The adjusted R-square (0.235) o f the OLS regression including LENDERS
indicates that the overall explanatory power o f the model is modest, but this is a
respectable figure for a cross-sectional, small sample-size analysis.

All o f the

variables have the correct signs except for COUNSMSA (-3.485) and RELIGION
(0.054). Neither o f these is statistically significant. The measurement problems of
COUNSMSA that were discussed in Chapter IV.4 may explain the poor performance
o f that variable in the regression.
The other measure o f market development, LENDERS, is positive and highly
significant. Each additional HECM lender that becomes active in an area is predicted
to lead to an increase o f HECMs demanded o f about 2.3, which represents about 20%
o f the mean o f the dependent variable HECM9000 (11.44).
WHITE is positive (0.141), as expected, and significant at the five percent
level.93 The regression results also support the hypothesis that education has a
positive influence on HECM demand— ED is positive (0.346) and significant at the
one percent level. The percent o f persons bom in the same state as their current
93 Hereinafter, all analyses o f statistical significance refer to one-tailed tests.
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residence is also found to influence demand. As expected, BORN_IN is negative (0.127), although it meets a lower threshold o f statistical significance (10%).
Fairly strong evidence is found supporting the theory that a weak attachment
to their community by the old (O LD jO U T is high) w ill result in a relatively low
demand for reverse mortgages. The coefficient on O LDJDUT equals -1.29. When
the percent o f old persons that out-migrate increases by one (or by about 16% o f
O L D jO U T ’s mean o f 6.1), then the number o f HECMs sold in an area is estimated to
decline by 1.29— or by about 11% o f the mean o f HECM9000.

OLDJDUT is

significant at the one percent level.
Weak family and community ties among the young are found to increase
demand for reverse mortgages. YJDUT is highly significant (1% level) and positive
(0.767).

A one-unit increase in YJDUT—seven percent o f its mean (14.86)— is

predicted to increase demand for HECMs by 0.767— approximately seven percent.
Approximating at the means, the elasticity o f demand with respect to young out
migration is equal to one. The elasticity o f demand with respect to old out-migration
is higher at about 1.5.
The OLS results provide rather strong support for the theory that an area’s
family and community ties influence demand for reverse mortgages. This implies
that a bequest motive among old homeowners has an effect on their decisions
regarding whether or not to take out these loans.
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V.l.B. OLS— LENDERS EXCLUDED
As discussed in Chapter IV.5, LENDERS is possibly endogenous. A more
rigorous accounting o f this possibility is given in Chapter V.2, where TSLS results
are presented.

It is interesting, though to compare the results from excluding

LENDERS from the OLS estimation from those described above, where LENDERS
was included.
The only noteworthy change is that COUNSMSA is negative (-3.485) in the
previous regression and positive (1.834) in the regression excluding LENDERS. The
values o f the remaining coefficients are similar to those in the previous regression,
although the levels o f significance are slightly different in a few cases. For example,
both YJDUT and OLDJDUT are significant at the five percent level, as opposed to
one percent previously.

The overall explanatory power does not change when

LENDERS is excluded (adjusted R-square equals .235).
Little harm, then, results from excluding the possibly endogenous LENDERS.
I f no suitable instruments for the variable could be found in order to perform a TSLS,
then it could be dropped from the analysis altogether without changing the picture
that emerges from the regressions: family and community ties o f an area do indeed
influence demand for reverse mortgages.

V.l.C.

P

o s s ib l e h e t e r o s c e d a s t ic it y in

OLS

The error terms in the OLS regression may be heteroscedastic. If this were
true, then OLS might not be the appropriate econometric specification for this study,
and an alternative specification such as a weighted least squares or a log-linear form
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might be preferred.

Although, in the presence o f heteroscedasticity, the OLS

estimators are unbiased, the estimated variances are biased, invalidating tests o f
significance.94
The possibility o f heteroscedasticity in the OLS regressions reported here may
be illustrated as follows.

Consider a model in which the dependent variable is

continuous. Let yjj be the value o f this variable for the ith person in the j th county. At
the individual level, the model is:

yii = a + Px,j + Ufj,

[Equation 1]

where Xy is the independent variable or a vector o f these variables, and Uy is the
disturbance term with a mean o f zero. Assume homoscedasticity at the individual
level:

Now average Equation 1 over the nj old homeowners composing potential demand in
the j th county to get

yj = a + Pxj + uj,
where y X j , and Uj are means. In this paper, y, = HECM9000. I f nj varies among
counties, the error term may be heteroscedastic:

94 Maddala (1992), Ch.5.
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That is, the disturbance may be inversely related to the size o f potential demand in the
county.95
W hite’s general test o f heteroscedasticity was used to+ determine whether or
not it is likely that the OLS disturbances are biased in this manner.96 To conduct the
test, the OLS residuals were squared and then regressed on a constant, the inverse o f
potential demand, and the squared inverse o f potential demand.

The number o f

observations was multiplied the resulting R-square to obtain the test statistic, which is
asymptotically distributed as j?[2] (the degrees o f freedom equals the number o f
regressors, excluding the constant).
In this instance, the ^ [2 ] statistic equals 0.8643, far below the critical value o f
9.22 at the one percent significance level; therefore, the null hypothesis that OLS is
homoscedastic is not rejected. The significance tests on the OLS coefficients that
were discussed in the preceding section therefore are valid.

V.2.

T w o -st a g e

least sq u a r e s

As discussed in Chapter IV.5, BANKS, MARRYKID, and INCOME are used as
instruments for the possibly endogenous LENDERS in the TSLS regression. An Ftest o f their joint significance reveals that, as a group, these are strong instruments for
LENDERS (F-ratio equals 23.04).97

9S One possible solution to this specific form o f heteroscedasticity—if indeed it exists— would
be to compute a weighted least squares regression using the square root o f nj as weights. [Johnston and
Dinardo (1997), pp.171-172.]
96 White (1980).
97 In the first stage of the TSLS, MARRYKID (coefficient o f .1133) and BANKS (coefficient o f .0568)
are significant at the one percent level (two-tailed). INCOME (coefficient o f .00002) is insignificant.
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The results o f the TSLS regression are strikingly similar to the OLS results—
all o f the coefficients are nearly identical, as are their levels o f significance. The only
difference— a relatively m inor one— is that the coefficient on LENDERS is about 10
percent lower in the TSLS regression, and its level o f significance is five percent
instead o f one percent.
Thus, the TSLS regression adds virtually nothing to the story already told by
OLS. This, along with the findings discussed in Chapter V .l.B regarding the OLS
regression excluding LENDERS, suggests that LENDERS is not endogenous.

A

Hausman x2-test o f the consistency o f OLS provides further confirmation that the
OLS specification reported in Chapter V.1.A is suitable for the purposes o f this
study.

The findings in that chapter that family and community ties influence

demand for reverse mortgages are sound.

98 The test is sometimes interpreted as testing the endogeneity of a particular variable, but technically
this is incorrect. The null hypothesis o f the test, which is performed under the assumption that the
OLS estimates are efficient and that the TSLS estimates are inefficient and consistent, is that the
differences in the coefficients from the OLS and TSLS regressions are not systematic. [Johnston and
Dinardo (1997), p.339.]

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

44

VI. CONCLUSION
Reverse mortgages are loans against home equity that do not have to be repaid
until the borrower moves, sells the home, or dies. This paper explores whether an
area’s family and community ties influence demand for one type o f reverse
mortgage—the HECM—but the implications extend to other types o f reverse
mortgages.

Although several previous studies obtained estimates o f the potential

demand for reverse mortgages, this is the first study, to my knowledge, o f how actual
demand may be determined, and o f how it may be related to potential demand.
The evidence concerning the impact o f market development is mixed:
although the number o f active HECM lenders (adjusted for potential demand in the
area) is found to have a significantly positive effect upon demand, the number o f
HECM counselors is found not to have a significant effect, and is negative in the two
regressions that include the lenders variable. This could be due to the measurement
imperfections o f the variable noted in Chapter IV.5.
Race is found to influence demand—the higher the percent o f the population
that is white, the greater demand. The overall educational achievement o f an area has
a significant, positive influence on demand, suggesting that more financially
sophisticated individuals are likelier to be receptive to the complicated reverse
mortgage loan.
Fairly strong evidence is found that family and community ties do influence
demand for reverse mortgages. One exception among the variables relating to family
or community ties is the variable on religious adherence.

Degree o f religious

adherence is not found to be significant; indeed, the coefficient on that variable has
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the wrong sign (positive) in all three regressions. Perhaps religious organizations— as
is true o f the Mormons in Utah— are involved in educating their older members about
reverse mortgages. If so, then this would have a positive influence on demand that
would confound the negative influence o f the family ties that the variable is intended
to reflect.
The other variables on family or community ties provide more convincing
results.
The variable YJDUT is significantly positive in all o f the regressions,
suggesting that weak family and community ties among the young have a positive
influence on demand.

OLDJDUT is significantly negative across the regressions:

when the old’s ties to their communities are weak, demand for reverse mortgages will
be low. Demand is predicted to fall when the percent o f persons that were bom in the
same state as their current residence rises.
A much more ambitious research project would involve estimating potential
demand for many counties throughout the United States. Unless only metropolitan
area counties are analyzed, such a project would also entail redefining out-migration,
which in this paper has been defined as moving from a county and out o f that
county’s metropolitan area.

Also, calculating out-migration figures is quite

cumbersome and time-consuming, as the data are not machine-readable, and must be
cut and pasted from “user-friendly” tables available on CD-ROMs prepared by the
Census. Perhaps new out-migration data that will be available from the 2000 census
will be easier to manipulate.
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The results o f this study suggest that a bequest motive for holding home
equity exists in some households. Financial institutions choosing to offer HECMs
therefore should be sensitive to the family ties in their marketing areas, both when
implementing outreach and informational programs designed for their constituents,
and when assessing the viability o f offering the HECM product.
The 50 initial lenders— each authorized to originate up to 50 HECMs— in the
HECM-demonstration were selected by lottery. Selection was based upon ten HUD
regions, and the proportion o f the nation’s total older homeowners that resided in
these regions.

According to HUD (1990), “the Department [HUD] could have

selected demonstration areas, defined by community or [s]tate.. . [but did not] on the
ground that the Department should not prejudge which communities. . . were suitable
participants.”99

While this strategy for initiating the demonstration may be

understandable, the results o f this study suggest that targeting areas o f weak family
ties, and areas where the old are unlikely to migrate out o f the community, might
have improved the success o f the program.

99 op. cit., p.4-13.
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Appendix A. Explanation o f Regression Variables.
The unit o f analysis is a county. All counties analyzed are in one o f 26
selected metropolitan areas in the United States. The expected signs o f the regression
coefficients are in parentheses following the variable names.
• Dependent variable:
HECM9000
The num ber o f Home Equity Conversion Mortgages (HECMs) endorsed
1990-2000 by the Federal Housing Administration for borrowers residing in
the county, divided by potential demand for reverse mortgages in the county
in 1989, times 1,000.
Potential demand equals the number o f homeowners aged 70 and over who
have $30,000 or more in home equity. Rasmussen, Megbolugbe, and Morgan
(1995) estimated potential demand for selected (P)MSAs. The county-level
figures used in this paper are weighted averages o f Rasmussen, Megbolugbe,
and M organ’s (P)MSA figures. The weights are based on the percent o f a
(P)M SA’s homeowners aged 75 and over that reside in each county (1990
data). Data on homeowners aged 70 and over were not available, so those
aged 75 and over were used instead.

• Independent variables relating: to both family and community ties:
Y jO U T (+)
The percent o f residents aged 25-39 in 1985 who moved to a county outside o f
the metropolitan area by 1990.
O L D O U T (-)
The percent o f residents aged 60-79 in 1985 who moved to a county outside o f
the metropolitan area by 1990.

• Independent variables relating to family ties:
RELIGION (-)
The percent o f residents who belong to a religious denomination (1990 data).
B O R N I N (-)
The percent o f the population who were bom in the county’s state (1990 data).
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• Other independent variables that influence demand for HECMs:
WHITE (+)
The percent o f the population who are white (1996 data).
ED (+)
The percent o f residents aged 25 and over who have graduated from college
(1990 data).

• Measures o f the degree to which the HECM market is developed.:
LENDERS (+)
The number o f lenders who sold HECMs in the county 1990-2000, divided by
potential demand for reverse mortgages in the county in 1989, times 1,000.
COUNSMSA (+)
The number o f HUD-approved HECM counselors in the county’s
metropolitan area as o f March 2001, divided by the metropolitan area’s
potential demand for reverse mortgages in 1989, times 1,000.

• The following variables are used as instruments for LENDERS in TSLS regressions:
BANKS
The number o f (FDIC-insured) commercial and savings bank offices in the
county as o f June 1995 divided by potential demand for reverse mortgages in
the county in 1989, times 1,000.
MARRYKID
The percent o f total households composed o f married couples living with their
children (1990 data).
INCOME
Median household money income (1993 data).
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Table 1. Availability o f d ifferen t Types o f Reverse Mortgages.
Type o f reverse morteaee

Availability
M ultipurpose, private sector loans:

HUD’s FHA-insured HECM*

All 50 states and D.C.

Fannie Mae's Home Keeper*

All 50 states and D.C.

Financial Freedom Senior Funding Corporation's
(FFSFC's) Cash Account Plan*

Current availability: AZ, CA, CO,
CT, FL, GA, IL, MD, MI, NV, NJ,
OR, PA, UT, VA, WA, WY, and
Washington, D.C. Availability
expected to extend to the following
states by April 2001: HI, IN, KY,
MA, MN, NM, NC, OH, TX, VT,
WI.

Special purpose, public sector loans:

Deferred payment loans**

Property tax deferrals**

Generally offered by local
nonprofit or government agencies
on housing or community
development
Available in all or parts o f CA,
CO, FL, GA, IL, IA, ME, MD,
MA, MI, NH, ND, OR, SD, TN,
TX, UT, VA, WA, WI, WY, and
D.C.

*Availability as o f February 2001.
**Availability as o f October 1996.
Source: Scholen (1997) for public-se*ctor loans; Tom Scabareti, Marketing Vice President
at FFSFC, for data on their Cash A ccount Plan (private communication); National Reverse
Mortgage Lenders Association's "Lenders List," accessed at
http://www.reversemortgage.org/Lemders%20Lists/lendersl.htm in February 2001, for data
on the HECM and Home Keeper.
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Figure 1. Out-Migration Matrix
County A:
OLD, YOUNG

County B:
OLD, young

County C:
old, YOUNG

County D:
old, young

Explanation: "YOUNG" means that a low percent o f young
people move out o f the county's metropolitan area; "young"
means that the percent is high. Similar definitions apply to
"OLD" and "old."
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Table 2. Itemized Costs on a HECM Loan
1. Origination Fee: The maximum allowable is the greater o f $2,000 or 2% o f the
“maximum claim amount,” which is the lesser o f the hom e’s value or FHA 203(b)
limit for the area. Can vary from lender to lender. May be financed by the loan.
2. Closing Costs: These include fees for services such as an appraisal, title searcli
and insurance, surveys, inspections, recording fees, mortgage taxes, etc. Generally
range from $1,000 to $1,800, but can be over $3,000 in some states, especially for
higher-valued homes. Lenders within the same state generally charge the same fees,
but there can be wide interstate differences. May be financed by the loan.
3. Mortgage Insurance: Charge in two parts: (1) an up-front premium o f 2% o f the
maximum claim amount, and (2) a monthly premium o f 1/12 of 0.5% o f the
outstanding principal balance. May be financed with the loan. The insurance
premiums are collected by FHA, which protects borrowers from lender default, and
lenders from “cross-over risk.” May be financed by the loan.
4.
Servicing Fee: Generally range from $20 to $30 per month for servicing the
loan, which includes making loan advances, transferring insurance premiums to
FHA, monitoring compliance o f the loan agreement (such as maintaining the home
and paying property taxes), and sending account statements. Fee is added to loan
balance each month.
5.
Interest Rates: Today, all lenders charge the same interest on HECM loans: the
1-year Treasury security index plus a lender’s margin. The lender’s margin is set by
Fannie Mae, which purchases virtually all HECMs (in the secondary market.) In
March 2001, the lender’s margin was 1.20 percentage points for monthly adjustable
loans, and 2.10 points for annually adjusted loans. While the interest rate applied to
the outstanding balance changes periodically with changes in the T-bill rate over the
life o f the loan, the payments to the borrower do not change. A fixed rate HECM is
also available, but very few have been originated because Fannie Mae will not
purchase fixed rate HECMs.
Source: Scholen (1997) except for interest rates, for which Roger Reynolds o f Wells Fargo and Ken
Scholen o f the National Center for Home Equity Conversion provided information in private
communications.
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Table 3. Average Number of Years of Life Remaining, Selected
Ages, Sex and Race, U.S., 1998.
Life ex pectancy (in years)
Age
Total
Females
MalesWhites
Blacks
17.8
65
19.2
16.0
17.8
16.1
14.3
70
15.5
12.8
14.4
13.0
11.3
75
12.2
10.0
11.3
10.5
80
8.6
9.2
7.5
8.5
8.2
Source: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (2001).
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Table 4. Characteristics of HECM Borrowers and AH Older Homeowners

Household characteristics
Median age (in years)

HECM
HECM borrowers
borrowers (1995
(1999 HUD
HUD analysis)*
analysis)*

All older
homeowners**

76

75

74

Median annual income***

510,368

NA

518,607

Sex/household composition:
Female living alone
Male living alone
Living with others

59.5%
12.4%
28.1%

56.3%
13.9%
29.8%

29.6%
8.3%
62.1%

Race/Ethnicity:
Non-Hispanic White
Non-Hispanic Black
Hispanic
Other

92.7%
5.9%
0.8%
0.6%

86.4%
9.2%
3.1%
1.3%

87.2%
7.8%
3.7%
1.3%

Note: NA = Not Available.
’•‘Minimum age o f a HECM borrower is 62 years. Data are from HECM application materials as o f the date of
application.
**For householders aged 65 and over. Figures are for 1997 [U.S. Census Bureau (1999)], except for median
income, which is for 1995 [U.S. Census Bureau (1997)].
***HUD (2000) warns that the data on the median income o f HECM borrowers may not be reliable; hence, the
figure here (taken from HUD (1995)) should be viewed with caution. (A later analysis o f the data revealed many
cases where values were zero or missing.)
Source: For HECM data, HUD (1995) and (2000); for all homeowners, U.S. Census Bureau (1997) and (1999),
except for race/ethnicity [HUD (2000)].
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T able 5. M etropolitan Areas and Com ponent Counties.
State/County FIPS
State/County FIPS
Code (1990
Metropolitan area and
Code (1990
definitions)
component counties
definitions)
Birmingham, AL
01009
Blount
36005
01073
Jefferson
36047
01115
St. Clair
36061
01117
Shelby
36079
01127
Walker
36081
Chicago, IL
36085
17031
Cook
36087
17043
Du Page
36119
17111
McHenry
Cleveland, OH
34013
39035
Cuyahoga
34027
39055
Geauga
34037
39085
Lake
34039
39103
Medina
Denver, CO
40017
08001
Adams
40027
08005
Arapahoe
40083
08031
Denver
40087
08035
Douglas
40109
08059
.'efferson
40125
Indianapolis, IN
18011
3oone
34005
18057
Jamilton
34007
Jancock
18059
34015
18063
Jendricks
42017
18081
ohnson
42029
18097
Vlarion
42045
Morgan
18109
42091
Shelby
18145
42101
(continued on next page)
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Metropolitan area and
component counties
New York, N Y
Bronx
Kings
New York
Putnam
Queens
Richmond
Rockland
Westchester
Newark, N J
Essex
Morris
Sussex
Union
Oklahoma City, OK
Canadian
Cleveland
L.ogan
McClain
Oklahoma
3ottawatomie
Philadelphia, PA-NJ
3urlington, NJ
Camden, NJ
Gloucester, NJ
Bucks, PA
Chester, PA
Delaware, PA
Montgomery, PA
Philadelphia, PA
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(Table 5 continued from previous page.)
State/County FIPS
C ode(1990
Metropolitan area and
definitions)
component counties
K.C., MO-KS
20091
Johnson, KS
20103
Leavenworth, KS
20121
Miami, KS
20209
Wyandotte, KS
29037
Cass, MO
29047
Clay, MO
29095
Jackson, MO
29107
Lafayette, MO
29165
Platte, MO
29177
Ray, MO
L.AJOrange Co., CA
06037
Los Angeles
06059
Orange
Memphis, TN-AR-MS
05035
Crittenden, AR
28033
De Soto, MS
47157
Shelby, TN
47167
Tipton, TN
Minneapolis, MN-W I
27003
Anoka
27019
Carver
27025
Chisago
27037
Dakota
27053
Tennepin
27059
'santi
27123
Ramsey
27139
Scott
27163
Washington
27171
Wright
55109
St. Croix, WT
(continued on next page)

State/County FIPS
Code (1990
definitions)
42003
42051
42125
42129
41005
41051
41067
41071
36051
36055
36069
36073
36117
49011
49035
49057
53033
53061
12053
12057
12101
12103
36029
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Metropolitan area and
component counties
Pittsburg, PA
Ailegheny, PA
Fayette, PA
Washington, PA
Westmoreland, PA
Portland, OR
Clackamas, OR
Multnomah, OR
Washington, OR
Yamhill, OR
Rochester, N Y
Livingston, NY
Monroe, NY
Ontario, NY
Orleans, NY
Wayne, NY
Salt Lake City, UT
Davis, UT
Salt Lake, UT
Weber, UT
Seattle, WA
■Cing, WA
Snohomish, WA
Tampa, FL
Jemando, FL
Hillsborough, FL
Pasco, FL
r’inellas, FL
Buffalo, N Y
Erie, NY
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(Table 5 continued from previous page.)
State/County FIPS
State/County FIPS
C o de(1990
Metropolitan area and
Code (1990
definitions)
component counties
definitions)
New Orleans, LA
22051
Jefferson Parish
13013
22071
Orleans Parish
13035
22087
St. Bernard Parish
13057
22089
St. Charles Parish
13063
22095
St. John the Baptist Parish 13067
22103
St. Tammany Parish
13077
Miami, FL
13089
12025
Dade, FL
13097
Phoenix, A Z
13113
04013
Maricopa, AZ
13117
San Diego, CA
13121
06073
San Diego, CA
13125
San Francisco, CA
13151
06041
Vlarin, CA
13217
06075
San Francisco, CA
13223
06081
San Mateo, CA
13247
Milwaukee, WI
13255
55079
Vlilwaukee, WI
13297
55089
Ozaukee, WI
55131
Washington, WI
55133
Waukesha, WI
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Metropolitan area and
component counties
Atlanta, GA
Barrow County
Butts County
Cherokee County
Clayton County
Cobb County
Coweta County
DeKalb County
Douglas County
Fayette County
Forsyth County
Fulton County
Gwinnett County
Henry County
Newton County
Paulding County
Rockdale County
Spalding County
Walton County
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Table 6. Summary Statistics.
Variable
HECM9000
YOUT
OLDJDUT
RELIGION
BORN IN
MARRYKID
WHITE
INCOME
ED
LENDERS
COUNSMSA
BANKS

Mean
11.44
14.86
6.10
54.92

Standard deviation
12.25

Minimum
0.37

Maximum
65.11

5.54
2.42
13.73

5.47
1.82
25.90

31.38
14.61
84.50

64.27
29.92
85.50
38,115
20.94
1.93
0.16
13.54

16.50
7.10
14.21

1.67
0.18

18.70
9.79
33.90
20,710
6.70
0.15
0.02

7.07

3.79

90.02
47.12
99.50
63,560
44.00
10.03
0.77
43.22

8,924
8.52

n = 129

Ul
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Table 7. Simple Correlation Matrix.
YJDUT OLDJDUT RELIGION B O R N JN MARRYKID WHITE INCOME ED
YJDUT
OLDJDUT
RELIGION
B O R N JN
MARRYKID
WHITE
INCOME
ED
LENDERS
COUNSMSA
BANKS

LENDERS COUNSMSA BANKS

1
0.5126

1

-0.0922

-0.1836

1

-0.5027

-0.4485

0.4809

1

-0.2893

-0.01

-0.0179

0.3498

1

-0.2758

0.0645

-0.2581

0.1716

0.5994

0.0517

0,501

-0.1421

-0.028

0.5787 0.4817

1

0.5082

0.507

-0.0773

-0.3746

-0.1758 -0.0516

0.5909

-0.1201

-0.0036

-0.0616

0.1844

0.6535 0.3346

0.4021 m m

0.3775

-0.1477

0.2027

0.1287

0.0533 -0.2351

-0.236 -0.1162

0,1006

-0.0037

0.0251

-0.0164

-0.0507

0.4613 0.1373

0.4939 0.2853

0,4698

1

0.0675

1
Ln
03

Table 8. Ordinary Least Squares, with and without LENDERS,
and Two-Stage Least Squares.1

V ariable

OLS with
LE N D E R S

OLS w ithout
LE N D E R S

TSLS2
0.756 **
(0.299)

YJDUT

0.767**
(0.296)

0.666’
(0.310)

OLDJDUT

-1.290**
(0.534)

RELIGION

0.054
(0.087)

-1.106*
(0.558)
0.030
(0.091)

0.051
(0.088)

B O R N JN

-0.127*
(0.086)

-0.097
(0.090)

-0.124 *
(0.087)

WHITE

0.141 *
(0.081)

0.221 **
(0.082)

0.149**
(0.086)

ED

0.346 **
(0.144)

0.348 **
(0.144)

COUNSMSA

-3.485
(7.225)

0.359**
(0.151)
1.834
(7.426)

LENDERS

2.265 **
(0.622)

constant

-9.961
(10.062)
129
0.235
10.718

Number o f obs.
Adj R-squared
Root MSE

—

-13.809
(10.501)
129
0.235
10.718

-1.271 **
(0.539)

-2.909
(7.478)
2.020 *
(1.024)
-10.377
(10.162)
129
0.234
10.725

Hausman x f-te st o f the
consistency o f OLS

—

—

0.09

F-ratio from a test o f the jo in t
significance o f the instrumental
variables F [3, 118]

—

—

23.04

* Significant at 10% (one-tailed test).
* Significant at 5% (one-tailed test).
Significant at 1% (one-tailed test).
1 Coefficients are reported (standard errors in parentheses).
2 Instrumented: LENDERS. Instruments: BANKS, MARRYKID, INCOME.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

60

Data S ources
•Potential demand fo r selected metropolitan areas:
Rasmussen, David W., Isaac F. Megbolugbe, a n d Barbara A. Morgan, “The Potential
Demand for Reverse Mortgage Products,” F annie Mae Office o f Housing Research,
Internal Research Report, April 1995.

•N um ber o f FHA-insared HECMs by county, lencder, and year:
Data were obtained from HUD.

•N um ber o f HUD-approved housing counseling agencies that provide HECM
counseling:
Data by state and zip code were obtained fro m HUD’s “Housing Counseling
Clearinghouse” website, http://www.hudhcc.org/agencies/hcamap.html. Counts o f
HECM counselors by county (and thus by m etropolitan area) were derived by using
Insight Software Solution’s Zip Express 2000 softw are to match county names to zip
codes.
•County-level out-migration, by age, 1985-1990:
U.S. Census Bureau, County-to-County M igration Flow Files, 1990 Census o f
Population and Housing, Special Project 312 (SP-312), Out-Migration, CD-ROM.

• Other county-level variables:
U.S. Census Bureau, USA Counties, 1998, CD-ROM .
U.S. Census Bureau, 1990 Summary Tape File I A, {C90STF1 A), accessed on the
Internet at http ://venus.census, gov/cdrom/1 ookup/.
Bradley, Martin B., Norman M. Green, Jr., Dale E . Jones, Mac Lynn, Lou McNeil
(1992). Churches and Church M embership in the United States, 1990: An
Enumeration by Region, State and County Based on Data Reported fo r 133
Church Groupings. Atlanta, Georgia: G lenm ary Research Institute.
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